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An Umbrella in a Hurricane:
Cyber Technology and the December 2013
Amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement
By Innokenty Pyetranker *
Scenes of near-apocalyptic devastation resulting from good software gone bad are no
longer the stuff of science fiction flicks starring bodybuilders-cum-governors. Lightningfast technological progress and the ubiquity of the Internet have made it easy for our
imaginations, as well as our political leaders, to conjure up realistic images of cyber
nightmares come true. Now that fears about what lurks inside cyberspace have gone
mainstream, I examine one action ostensibly aimed to allay such fears: the December 2013
amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (commonly known as the Wassenaar Arrangement).
My analysis of the December 2013 amendment—which was passed to prevent certain dualuse cyber technologies from falling into the wrong hands—proceeds in three parts. First,
I argue that history teaches that cyber products are not generally amendable to export
controls. Second, I find that the Wassenaar Arrangement’s institutional flaws are so
enfeebling that the Arrangement’s very utility is questionable. Third, I assert that economic
incentives, globalization, and the intangibility of cyber technology all present formidable
obstacles to the December 2013 amendment’s success. Although the December 2013
amendment is likely doomed to irrelevance, I conclude that concerted action—rather than
passive pessimism—must be our response to cyber threats.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A.

The New (Cyber) Normal

It doesn’t take much to imagine the consequences of a successful cyber attack. In
a future conflict, an adversary unable to match our military supremacy on the
battlefield might seek to exploit our computer vulnerabilities here at home. Taking
down vital banking systems could trigger a financial crisis. The lack of clean water
or functioning hospitals could spark a public health emergency. And as we’ve seen
in past blackouts, the loss of electricity can bring businesses, cities and entire
regions to a standstill. 1

¶1

That people now reside in something of a cyber world is a truism; it is a given that a
multitude of our experiences from the cradle to the grave—from instagrammed sonogram
shots 2 to online education modules 3 to corporate web conferencing 4 to mobile dating apps 5
to virtual memorials for lost loved ones 6—have gone or will eventually go cyber to some
Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2012, 7:15 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444330904577535492693044650.
2
See, e.g., Esther Lee, Snooki Shares Sonogram Picture of Baby Girl: Pregnant Star Says Daughter
“Already Applying Lipstick” in Womb, US WEEKLY (May 19, 2014, 5:50 PM),
http://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-moms/news/snooki-sonogram-picture-pregnant-stars-baby-girlapplying-lipstick-2014195.
3
See, e.g., Sarah Mishkin, Saudi Arabia to use edX web courses to train unemployed, FIN. TIMES (July
14, 2014, 7:55 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/67fe0cb8-0c3d-11e4-943b-00144feabdc0.html; Chris
Parr, Mooc makeover saves refugee course, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. (July 17, 2014),
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/mooc-makeover-saves-refugee-course/2014493.article.
4
See, e.g., June Bower, 4 Ways Video Conferencing Can Benefit Small Businesses, MASHABLE (June 2,
2011), http://mashable.com/2011/06/02/online-meetings-small-biz/; Yardena Arar, Web conferencing
showdown: What’s the best software for online meetings?, PCWORLD (Sept. 24, 2012, 3:30 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2010325/web-conferencing-showdown-whats-the-best-software-foronline-meetings.html.
5
See, e.g., Devjyot Ghoshal, Mobile dating apps suggest that the World Cup is a potent aphrodisiac,
QUARTZ (June 25, 2014), http://qz.com/225744/the-world-cup-is-a-potent-aphrodisiac-for-mobile-datingapps/; Julie Spira, Mobile Love: 10 Dating Apps to Ramp Up Your Love Life, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 27,
2013, 2:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-spira/mobile-love-mobile-dating_b_4318293.html.
6
See, e.g., Maya Socolovsky, Cyber-Spaces of Grief: Online Memorials and the Columbine High
School Shootings, 24 JAC: A JOURNAL OF RHETORIC, CULTURE & POLITICS 467 (2004); Kenneth
Emmerling, Online memorials and cyber immortality, EXAMINER (Nov. 9, 2009),
http://www.examiner.com/article/online-memorials-and-cyber-immortality; Geoffrey A. Fowler, Online
Memorial Services: After a Death, Celebrating a Life Online, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303553204579348752262042642.
1
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extent. 7 The Internet is so embedded in and indispensable to our day-to-day lives that
access to it is described in the language of human rights. 8 All the benefits of living in a
networked society are, however, tempered by concomitant risks. In addition to the familiar
perils of warfare, crime, espionage, and terrorism, new threats of cyberwarfare, 9
cybercrime, 10 cyberespionage, 11 and cyberterrorism 12 have emerged. In this brave new
cyber-world, these dangers and others are poised to exploit our reliance on e-lifestyles.
Cyberspace is already an established arena for confrontations. Virtual attacks
regularly harm or even cripple individual businesses. 13 Cybercriminals threaten entire
sectors of the global economy. 14 In late 2014, a single act of “cyber-vandalism” caused a
See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY IN A HYPERCONNECTED WORLD 5 (2014),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_RiskResponsibility_HyperconnectedWorld_Report_2014.pdf
[hereinafter WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM] (“Digital technology touches virtually every aspect of daily life
today. Social interaction, healthcare activity, political engagement or economic decision-making – digital
connectivity permeates it all, and the dependence on this connectivity is growing swiftly.”).
8
See Nathan Olivarez-Giles, United Nations report: Internet access is a human right, L.A. TIMES (June
3, 2011, 6:42 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/06/united-nations-report-internetaccess-is-a-human-right.html.
9
See, e.g., TED Talks, Chris Domas: The 1s and 0s behind cyber warfare, YOUTUBE (June 30, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cWpRxyqDgpM; Ellen Nakashima, U.S. cyberwarfare force to grow
significantly, defense secretary says, WASH. POST, (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyberwarfare-force-to-grow-significantlydefense-secretary-says/2014/03/28/0a1fa074-b680-11e3-b84e-897d3d12b816_story.html; Spencer
Kimball, NATO moves to apply armed conflict law to cyber warfare, DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 2, 2014),
http://dw.de/p/1CUid.
10
See generally CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL COPS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT (Jack M. Balkin, James
Grimmelmann, Eddan Katz, Nimrod Kozlovski, Shlomit Wagman & Tal Zarsky eds., 2007); Nimrod
Kozlovski, A Paradigm Shift in Online Policing - Designing Accountable Policing (June 2005) (J.S.D.
dissertation, Yale Law School) (available at http://crypto.stanford.edu/portia/papers/Kozlovski.pdf)
(describing the nature of cybercrime).
11
See, e.g., Lizzie Dearden, Germany ‘may use manual typewriters’ to fight cyber espionage,
INDEPENDENT (July 15, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/germany-mayuse-manual-typewriters-to-fight-cyber-espionage-9607697.html; Juhana Rossi, Finland Victim of LongTerm Cyberespionage, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/finland-victim-of-longterm-cyberespionage-1404309676.
12
See generally Aviv Cohen, Cyberterrorism: Are We Legally Ready?, 9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1 (2010);
Gabriel Weimann, Cyberterrorism: How Real Is the Threat?, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (May
13, 2004), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr119.pdf.
13
See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 7, at 2-3 (“Risks of cyberattacks are starting to have a
business impact. Controls put in place to protect information assets have at least a “moderate” impact on
front-line employee productivity for nearly 90% of institutions [that were surveyed]. Moreover, security
concerns are already making companies delay implementation of cloud and mobile technology capabilities.
And while direct cyber resilience spend represents only a small share of total enterprise technology
expenditure, some chief information officers (CIOs) and chief information security officers (CISOs)
estimate that indirect or unaccounted security requirements drive as much as 20-30% of overall technology
spending, crowding other projects that could create business value.“). See also Jonathan Zittrain,
Intensifying Cyber Threats, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2014, 12:36 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-zittrain/intensifying-cyber-threats_b_4645548.html (“[T]he
Syrian Electronic Army, which supports Bashar al-Assad’s regime, has successfully managed to
temporarily cripple the online operations of companies like Twitter and The New York Times.”).
14
See, e.g., Craig Newman & Daniel Stein, Talking heads: why regulators are looking at cyber security,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/53125dc0-00ec-11e3-8918-00144feab7de.html
(“[T]he International Organization of Securities Commissions reports that 53 per cent of the world’s
7
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national scandal and diplomatic kerfuffle. 15 Indeed, cyber controversies play a
consequential role in some bilateral relationships; between the United States and China,
for instance, allegations and counter allegations of cyber espionage consistently threaten
to mar ties between the two countries. 16 Some have convincingly argued that an actual war
conducted on a cyber battlefield “is still more hype than hazard,” 17 but signs of the future
are already visible. For instance, the use of cyber assaults by Russian forces against
Georgia in 2008, illuminated—in the words of Professor John Arquilla—“the potential of
cyberwar in a manner not unlike the way the Spanish Civil War foreshadowed the rising
dominance of air power 75 years ago, offering a preview of World War II’s deadly aerial
bombings.” 18 More bluntly, Professor Ty Cobb predicts that cyberspace will be the setting
in which 21st century conflicts will be fought. 19
Cyberspace is also an established arena for regulation. Many sovereign states address
cyber issues in domestic legislation. 20 Politicians from a number of countries—including
securities exchanges were hit last year by cyber attacks, and that nearly every exchange recognises cyber
crime as a significant, systematic risk…The annual worldwide cost of cyber crime has been estimated at
$100bn, and studies have shown that financial services companies are among the most frequently
affected.”).
15
See, e.g., Brent Lang, Obama Calls Sony Hack ‘Cyber Vandalism,’ Not Act of War, VARIETY, (Dec.
21, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://variety.com/2014/film/news/obama-calls-sony-hack-cyber-vandalism-not-actof-war-1201384777/ (“President Barack Obama told CNN that North Korea’s hack attack on Sony Pictures
Entertainment is an act of ‘cyber-vandalism,’ not an act of war.”); Patrick Frater, Sony Hacking Spells
Diplomatic Farce as China Weighs in With Equivocal Position, VARIETY (Dec. 21, 2014, 4:20 AM PT),
http://variety.com/2014/film/news/sony-hacking-spells-diplomatic-farce-as-china-weighs-in-withequivocal-position-1201384689/ (“The chorus of accusations over the hacking of Sony Pictures
Entertainment this weekend developed into a bout of diplomatic baiting and back-biting.”).
16
See, e.g., William Wan & Ellen Nakashima, Report ties cyberattacks on U.S. computers to Chinese
military, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/report-ties-100-plus-cyberattacks-on-us-computers-to-chinese-military/2013/02/19/2700228e-7a6a-11e2-9a75dab0201670da_story.html (reporting that senior U.S. officials, including President Obama, have repeatedly
raised the issue of Chinese cyber attacks on commercial targets with Chinese government officials); Eyder
Peralta, U.S. Files Criminal Charges Against Chinese Officials Over Cyberspying, NPR (May 19, 2014,
9:42 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/05/19/313935588/reports-u-s-files-criminalcharges-against-chinese-officials-over-cyber-spying (describing the U.S. government’s 2014 decision to
file criminal charges against five Chinese military-affiliated hackers for stealing commercial secrets from
American companies); Jonathan Kaiman, China reacts furiously to US cyber-espionage charges,
GUARDIAN (May 20, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/20/china-reactsfuriously-us-cyber-espionage-charges (“China’s foreign ministry called the allegations preposterous and
accused the US of double standards. The assistant foreign minister, Zheng Zeguang, summoned the US
ambassador, Max Baucus, to lodge a formal complaint…China also accused the US of hypocrisy, tacitly
recalling Edward Snowden’s revelations last year that Washington had overseen the hacking of Chinese
companies, including the Shenzhen-based telecommunications company Huawei.”).
17
Thomas Rid, Think Again: Cyberwar, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar.
18
John Arquilla, Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar_is_already_upon_us.
19
Ty Cobb, Cyber Warfare: Where the 21st Century Conflicts Will be Fought, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
(Mar. 5, 2012, 10:36 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2012/03/cyber-warfare-where-the-21st-century-conflictswill-be-fought/.
20
See, e.g., ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 52-61 (2013),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf (listing U.S. laws with provisions related to cybersecurity);
Pavan Duggal, Indian Cyber Law Developments 2013, ECON. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2013, 1:46 PM),
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the United States—have been especially adamant about improving cyber security in the
private sector. 21 Multilateral efforts to tackle cybercrime, 22 cyber crises, 23 and the export
of cyber technology24 illustrate the seriousness with which world leaders treat cyberspace.
B.
¶4

Article Outline

Cyber menaces looming on the horizon pose grave risks for individuals, businesses,
and sovereign members of the international community alike. Recognizing the
multifaceted nature of cyber threats, this Article takes a single, discrete danger—the
proliferation of certain potentially destabilizing cyber products—and analyzes a single,
discrete action that the international community has collectively taken to address that
danger. Thus, this Article concentrates on the Wassenaar Arrangement—a global export
control regime that has been labeled “the only important multilateral arrangement that
addresses the conventional arms trade and high-technology items with military
applications” 25—and a recent Wassenaar Arrangement amendment intended to regulate the
trade of certain dual-use cyber technologies (i.e., technologies that have both civilian and
military uses). Part II provides background information on the global system for regulating
http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/Cyberlawsintodaystimes/entry/indian-cyber-law-developments2013 (describing recent developments in Indian cyberlaw); Michael Knigge, German jitters over cyber
attacks, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Mar. 8, 2013, http://www.dw.de/german-jitters-over-cyber-attacks/a-16658040
(“This week Germany’s Interior Ministry released a first draft of a new law aimed at ‘raising the security of
IT systems.’”); Brazil aims to bring order to lawless cyberspace, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2013, 3:35 PM),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/brazil-cyberfraud-idUKL1N0BP52J20130226 (“Long seen as the
Wild West of online fraud, Brazil is about to implement its first cyber-crimes law in an attempt to protect
its rapidly expanding banking and e-commerce industries.”).
21
See, e.g., Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Special Assistant to the President and White House
Cybersecurity Coordinator Michael Daniel – 007 or DDoS: What is Real World Cyber?, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-02-28_final_rsa_speech.pdf
(“One governmental role is clear and uncontroversial: the government should help you – private sector
companies – help yourself, particularly in the area of prevention.”); South Africa launches National Cyber
Security Advisory Council, IT NEWS AFRICA (Oct. 15, 2013, http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2013/10/southafrica-launches-national-cyber-security-advisory-council/ (describing South Africa’s “National Cyber
Security Policy Framework,” a statute that seeks to foster cooperation between the government, private
sector, and civil society in the realm of cyber security); Kelly Ng, Cyber Security Remains a Priority for
Singapore Government, FUTUREGOV (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.futuregov.asia/articles/2014/jan/29/cyber-security-remains-priority-singapore-governme/
(summarizing the Singaporean government’s strategy to improve cyber security in the country; embedded
in the strategy are partnerships between the government and the Singaporean private sector).
22
See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. 185, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm.
23
See Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New ‘Digital Divide’: Analyzing the
Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 119, 141 (2014) (describing the “International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats,” a
comprehensive alliance against cyber threats that is tasked with providing cybersecurity assistance and
support to the International Telecommunication Union’s 192 member–states as well as to other United
Nations organizations).
24
See infra Part IV (providing background information on the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral
export regime that controls the export of, inter alia, cyber technology products).
25
Michael Lipson, The Reincarnation of CoCom: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls, 6
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 33, 33 (quoting William W. Keller, The Political Economy of Conventional Arms
Proliferation, 96 CURRENT HIST. 179 (1997)).
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exports. Part III summarizes key elements of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Part IV
examines the December 2013 amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement. Part V argues
that the Wassenaar Arrangement, even with the addition of the December 2013
amendment, is ill-equipped to stem the export of dangerous cyber technologies for
historical, institutional, and theoretical reasons. Part VI concludes.
II. EXPORT CONTROLS AT A GLANCE
¶5

Also known as “export restraints” or “export restrictions,” export controls are defined
as “measures instituted by exporting countries to supervise export flows.” 26 Governments
utilize export controls to manage the flow of goods, services, and technologies across
borders. Export controls are different from export bans in that the former give government
regulators the legal authority to review, approve, and deny exports. 27 Generally,
governments manage exports as a means of implementing any number of public policy
objectives. Some products are controlled in order to support domestic industries. 28 Other
products are controlled for the maintenance of the admittedly amorphous concept of
“international security.” Professor Philippe Achilleas explains international security in the
following way:
The protection of international security is based on three complementary
techniques. Firstly, there is disarmament, which is aimed at eliminating one
category of weapon. Secondly, there is arms control, which is aimed at reducing
the risk of war, making it less destructive when war starts, and reducing defense
costs through the signing of agreements between countries. These agreements are
aimed at reducing, limiting or regulating the use of certain weapons. Finally, nonproliferation is aimed at preventing the development and sale of particular
weapons. 29

¶6

Although export control regimes do not contribute to the first technique described
above, which is better represented by initiatives like disarmament treaties, 30 multilateral
Joanna Bonarriva, Michelle Koscielski, & Edward Wilson, Export Controls: An Overview of Their
Use, Economic Effects, and Treatment in the Global Trading System 1 (Office of Industries, U.S. Int’l
Trade Commission, Working Paper No. ID-23, 2009), available at
www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ID-23.pdf (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
27
Tim Maurer, Exporting the Right to Privacy, SLATE (May 15, 2014, 7:54 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/05/wassenaar_arrangement_u_s_export_contro
l_reform_keeping_surveillance_tech.html.
28
See, e.g., Michael William Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restraint on Automobile Exports: An
Abandonment of the Free Trade Principles of the GATT and the Free Market Principles of United States
Antitrust Laws, 27 HARV. INT’L L. J. 99, 99 (1986) (“In May of 1981, the Japanese government announced
that it would restrict the number of automobiles its car manufacturers exported to the United States market
during the following three years. This restriction was the apparent result of intense political pressure by
domestic industry and labor organizations.”).
29
Philippe Achilleas, International Regimes, in EXPORT CONTROL LAW AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK
20 (Yann Aubin & Arnaud Idiart eds., 2007).
30
Disarmament treaties generally take three forms: security disarmament treaties, humanitarian
disarmament treaties, and hybrid disarmament treaties. Bonnie Docherty, Ending Civilian Suffering: The
Purpose, Provisions, and Promise of Humanitarian Disarmament Law, 15 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L.
7, 12 (2010). Security disarmament treaties “focus on the elimination of certain weapons of war.“ Id.
26
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export controls geared towards controlling the spread of potentially dangerous cutting-edge
technologies—the subject of this Article—function as part of the latter two techniques.
That is, these types of export controls aim to both moderate the destructiveness of cyber
conflicts (arms control) and preemptively forestall the transfer of weaponizable
technologies (non-proliferation). Countries are incentivized to participate in export control
agreements for essentially the same reasons. Indeed, Professors Ron Smith and Bernard
Udis posit that a state might participate in an export control regime to, inter alia, stop the
spread of weapons that “may prolong a war,” avert both “an expensive arms race” and
“pre-emptive aggression,” and “prevent the sale of weapons to a potential enemy.” 31
Modern export controls emerged during the Cold War. After receiving reports
detailing the Soviet Union’s acquisition of Western technology for military purposes, the
United States and its allies “worried that, as Lenin had predicted, the Capitalist West would
sell the Communist East the rope with which to hang it.” 32 In response, Western Bloc
powers formed the Coordinating Committee for the Control of Multinational Trade
(CoCom) to prevent the transfer of arms, nuclear-related items, and dual-use technologies
to the Eastern Bloc. 33 Following the end of the Cold War, CoCom was disbanded and
replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, a regime that embraced many former Eastern Bloc
countries as “parties rather than adversaries.” 34
Commonly known as “the Wassenaar Arrangement” or “the Arrangement,” the
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies is but one element of today’s multilateral export control system; that
system comprises four “separate and almost wholly independent” regimes. 35 Aside from
Humanitarian disarmament treaties focus on “reduc[ing] the suffering of individuals in times of war.” Id. at
16. Hybrid disarmament treaties “represent a blend of elements characteristic of security disarmament and
humanitarian disarmament, while moving increasingly toward the latter.” Id. at 13.
31
Ron Smith & Bernard Udis, New Challenges to Arms Export Control: Whither Wassenaar?, 8
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 81, 82 (2001).
32
Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on Technology Transfers
in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 441, 450 (2003). See also Robert Y. Stebbings,
Export Controls: Extraterritorial Conflict—The Dilemma of the Host Country Employee, 19 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 303, 313 (1987) (“According to U.S. intelligence sources, the Soviet KGB is directing a massive
campaign to acquire Western technology, coordinated at the highest levels of the Soviet government.
Although deficient in military manpower and perhaps even firepower, the NATO countries have
maintained a technological advantage over Warsaw Pact countries. Therefore, defense experts wish to
assure the maintenance of technological “lead time” by restricting exports and reexports of the most
advanced technology and goods which can be used militarily, as well as commercially, or from which the
technology can be gleaned.”) (citation omitted).
33
See Corr, supra note 32, at 450-51. See also Stebbings, supra note 32, at 312 (“The main purpose of
COCOM is to implement a system of multilateral control of various commodities and technical data that
may affect the national security of a given member nation. COCOM member countries agree to monitor all
imports and exports as they may affect each country’s national security. Reexportation from a COCOM
member country to a “controlled country” is not allowed without consent from the original exporting
member and requires a unanimous vote of COCOM members. Controlled countries include almost all
communist nations, the interests of which are deemed inimical to the interests of the COCOM member
nations. These nations are: Cuba, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Angola, Tibet, North Korea, South Africa, Libya,
Nicaragua, Albania, Laos, Outer Mongolia, Namibia, the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact nations.”).
34
Charles B. Shotwell, Export Controls: A Clash of Imperatives, in 1 THE GLOBAL CENTURY:
GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 335, 455 (2001).
35
Daniel H. Joyner, Restructuring the multilateral export control regime system, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC.
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the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is intended to “contribute to regional and international
security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility” in the global
trade of munitions and dual-use products, the other three regimes are the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime. 36 The Nuclear
Suppliers Group is made up of countries that have been working together to restrict the
proliferation of nuclear weapons since 1992. 37 The Australia Group focused only on
“international export controls on chemical weapons precursor chemicals” when it was first
formed in 1985, but eventually the organization “expanded its focus to include chemical
production equipment and technologies and measures to prevent the proliferation of
biological weapons.” 38 Created in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime includes
“member countries that have agreed to coordinate their national export controls to stem
missile proliferation.” 39 The principal aim of all four regimes is to control exports of certain
items via the coordination and harmonization of member states’ nonproliferation policies.40
III. THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
¶9

In July 1996, representatives of 33 countries met in Vienna, Austria and agreed to go
forward with the Wassenaar Arrangement. 41 To implement the agreement, the founding
members of the Arrangement placed export controls on items enumerated in two lists: the
Munitions List and the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. 42 “Munitions” are easy
to conceptualize as they are basically synonymous with military weapons; munitions that
are regulated by the Arrangement include bombs, torpedoes, and grenades. 43 “Dual-use
goods and technologies” are best explained by way of illustration:
A personal computer (PC) is the quintessential example of an item that has
both military and commercial purposes. John Q. Citizen in America uses his Apple
Powerbook laptop to keep his financial house in order, a commercial use of a PC.
However, an underground terrorist organization in a dark corner of the world could
use that same Powerbook to build a dirty bomb, using the laptop for weapons
L. 181, 183 (2004).
36
Multilateral Export Control Regimes, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/multilateral-exportcontrol-regimes (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See Joyner, supra note 35, at 184-85.
41
See Press Statement, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL
ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES (July 12, 1996),
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/1996/press120796.html. The 33 countries were Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
42
See id.
43
List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON
EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 170 (2013),
http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/2013/WA-LIST%20%2813%29%201/WALIST%20%2813%29%201.pdf.
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proliferation. Therefore, the laptop is a “dual use” item - it has both commercial
and military applications. 44

¶10

In setting up the Arrangement, members of the group had four primary goals. First,
members sought to promote “transparency and greater responsibility with regard to
transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies” and thereby forestall
“destabilizing accumulations” of those items. 45 Second, members aspired to use domestic
policies to ensure that transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies
would not contribute to the development of military capabilities. 46 Third, members wanted
to complement and reinforce “the existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems, as well as other internationally recognized measures designed
to promote transparency and greater responsibility.” 47 Fourth, members were interested in
“enhancing cooperation to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use
items for military end-uses, if the situation in a region or the behavior of a state is, or
becomes, a cause for serious concern.” 48 To achieve these collective goals, the founding
members of the Wassenaar Arrangement committed to sharing information, controlling the
distribution of items on the munitions and dual-use lists, and notifying one another of
transfers and denials of listed items to non-members. 49
¶11
The declared goals of the Wassenaar Arrangement, lofty as they may be, have always
been subject to institutional realities. The earnest commitments made by member states are
not really enforceable. 50 Those enforcement issues are only worsened by the
Arrangement’s notification mechanisms. 51 Funding for the Arrangement is far from
transparent and only mentioned once in its guiding documents. 52 And reforming any of the
Arrangement’s flaws is a tough row to hoe because all decisions need to be “reached by
consensus of the Participating States.” 53 Consensus-based decision-making plainly
becomes harder as the number of decision-makers grows. Decision-making proved
difficult with the thirty-three original members; with new additions Croatia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Slovenia, and South Africa, the organization now
embraces forty-one member states. 54 Technically, the Arrangement could become even
Jordan Collins, Same Laws, Different Century: The Bureau of Industry & Security’s Role in Global
Trade & National Security, 15 CURRENTS INT’L L. J. 108, 110 (2006).
45
See Press Statement, supra note 41.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See Jamil Jaffer, Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 519, 520
(2002) (“The Wassenaar Arrangement attempts to control proliferation of dual-use technologies through a
variety of mechanisms, including controls on distribution, information-sharing among member states, and
notification of transfers or denials of dual-use goods to non-member states.”) (citation omitted).
50
See infra Part V.B.1 (describing the Wassenaar Arrangement’s enforceability problems).
51
See infra Part V.B.2 (describing the Wassenaar Arrangement’s counterproductive notification
provisions).
52
Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON
EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 6 (2014),
http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/Guidelines%20and%20procedures%20including%20the%20Init
ial%20Elements.pdf (“Financial needs of the Arrangement will be covered under annual budgets, to be
adopted by Plenary Meetings.”).
53
Id.
54
Participating States, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL
44
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more unwieldy in the future; more countries could theoretically join the Arrangement
provided they fulfill the “agreed membership criteria,” which include adherence to the
other three multilateral export control regimes and maintenance of both “adequate” export
controls and “responsible” policies towards countries that threaten international peace and
security. 55
IV. THE CYBER AMENDMENT TO THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
¶12

The Wassenaar Arrangement’s control lists are not static; members agreed from the
beginning that the lists would “be reviewed regularly to reflect technological developments
and experience gained by Participating States.” 56 With a cyber menace looming on the
horizon 57 and no single international agency or body with the mandate to deal with cybersecurity, the Wassenaar Arrangement eventually sprang into action. Growing calls for
action on matters of cybersecurity came to fruition during a December 2013 meeting. 58
Following that meeting, the Arrangement issued a public statement proclaiming that
member states had agreed on new export controls for technologies that “under certain
conditions, may be detrimental to international and regional security and stability.” 59
Daniel Reisner and Doron Hindin suggest that these new export controls, which effectively
constituted a “cyber amendment,” were a bid “to curtail the proliferation of ‘active’ or
‘offensive’ cyber technologies [that are] used to initiate offensive cyber attacks or actively
mine and analyze protected data.” 60
ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html (last
visited Sept. 8, 2015).
55
See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20517, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS EXPORT CONTROLS: THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENTS 3 (2006),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20517.pdf.
56
Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, supra note 52, at 4.
57
See supra Part I (explaining the dangers emanating from cyberspace).
58
See Sam Jones, Arms deal sets limits on cyber technologies, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2013,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d4653c82-641d-11e3-98e2-00144feabdc0.html (explaining that leaders of
Wassenaar Arrangement member states were particularly concerned about “the notion that technologies
may end up in the hands of terrorist groups or hostile organisations and be used to thwart western
surveillance operations or mount cyber attacks.”). See also Willie Jones, Treaty Limiting Weapons Exports
Updated to Include Cyberweapons, IEEE SPECTRUM, Dec. 6, 2013,
http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/telecom/security/treaty-limiting-weapons-exports-updated-to-includecyberweapons (“Diplomats representing several Western governments are huddling in Vienna this week in
the hopes of finalizing new, Internetrelated additions to the Wassenaar Arrangement. That pact—under
which the United States, Russia, Japan, France, Germany and dozens of other signatories agree to strictly
limit exports of certain weapons—is being updated in order to control access to complex surveillance and
hacking software and cryptography. These countries hope to keep sophisticated cyberweapons out of what
they consider to be the wrong hands despite explosive growth (pun intended) in the cybersnooping
market.”).
59
Plenary Statement: 2013 Plenary Meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT
CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2013),
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2013/WA%20Plenary%20Public%20Statement%202013.pdf.
60
Daniel Reisner & Doron Hindin, Caught by surprise: Israel’s export control regime and cyber
technologies, WORLDECR, 29 (2014). See also Sam Jones, Cyber war technology to be controlled in same
way as arms, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2903d504-5c18-11e3-931e00144feabdc0.html (describing the December 2013 Wassenaar Arrangement meeting as one in which
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¶13

The cyber amendment was manifested in a number of changes to the Wassenaar
Arrangement’s control list of dual-use goods and technologies; two changes called for
member states to apply new export controls to software. 61 One such change was the
addition of category 5.A.1.j, which mandates export controls on certain forms of software
and associated goods, specifically “IP network communications surveillance systems or
equipment, and specially designed components therefor.” 62 The technology in question
must perform certain functions on a “carrier class IP Network” and be “specifically
designed” to carry out specified processes. 63 The former requires “[a]nalysis at the
application layer,” “[e]xtraction of selected metadata and application content,” and the
“indexing” of this extracted data. 64 The latter requires that the technology was designed
either for the “[e]xecution of searches on the basis of ‘hard selectors’” or for “[m]apping
of the relational network of an individual or of a group of people.” 65
¶14
The other change was the addition of category 4.A.5, which calls on member states
to apply export controls to “[s]ystems, equipment, and components therefor, specially
designed or modified for the generation, operation or delivery of, or communication with,
‘intrusion software.’” 66 The Arrangement defines “intrusion software” as:
“Software” specially designed or modified to avoid detection by
“monitoring tools,” or to defeat “protective countermeasures,” of a
computer or network-capable device, and performing any of the following:
(a) The extraction of data or information, from a computer or networkcapable device, or the modification of system or user data; or (b) The
modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order
to allow the execution of externally provided instructions. 67
member states were trying to reach “an agreement to put sensitive cyber security technologies on the same
footing as regular armaments”).
61
Sam Jones, supra note 58 (explaining that the cyber amendment called on Wassenaar Arrangement
members to place controls on “sales of internet communications surveillance systems and intrusion
software”).
62
List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON
EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 81 (2013),
http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/2013/WA-LIST%20%2813%29%201/WALIST%20%2813%29%201.pdf.
63
Id. Category 5.A.l.j reads in full:
IP network communications surveillance systems or equipment, and specially designed
components therefor, having all of the following:
1. Performing all of the following on a carrier class IP network (e.g., national grade IP
backbone):
a. Analysis at the application layer (e.g., Layer 7 of Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) model (ISO/IEC 7498-1));
b. Extraction of selected metadata and application content (e.g., voice, video,
messages, attachments); and
c. Indexing of extracted data; and
2. Being specially designed to carry out all of the following:
a. Execution of searches on the basis of ‘hard selectors’; and
b. Mapping of the relational network of an individual or of a group of people.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 73.
67
Id. at 209.
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The Arrangement defines the term “software” as “[a] collection of one or more
‘programmes’ or ‘microprogrammes’ fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 68
¶15
Both additions to the Wassenaar Arrangement are meant to address threats posed by
cyber technology, focusing primarily on software that facilitates data mining and analysis.
Software qualifying under the Arrangement’s revised rubric is now subject to export
controls.
V. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF THE 2013 CYBER AMENDMENT
¶16

Despite the hoopla surrounding the changes made at the Wassenaar Arrangement’s
December 2013 meeting, the cyber amendment may prove to be ineffective in controlling
the proliferation of dangerous cyber technologies for historical, institutional, and
theoretical reasons.
A.

Historical Argument

¶17

Attempts to control the flow of technology across borders have not always been
successful. The most relevant failure in recent memory is the U.S.-sponsored effort to
restrict the export of encryption technology via the Wassenaar Arrangement in the late
1990s.
¶18
An encryption program generally encodes information in “an unintelligible form”69
and thereby ensures the “confidentiality of communications.” 70 More technically:
Encryption permits transformation of passwords or messages into a form
that cannot be understood without access to special information necessary
to decode the password or message. Messages are scrambled by application
of a mathematical algorithm. The algorithm allows the user to select a key.
The key allows the user to decrypt messages. Encryption strength increases
with the length of the key. Key length is generally measured in bits. 71
Encryption technology is dual-use in that it can be used to, for instance, protect consumer
data 72 (a civilian purpose) and intercept enemy communications during armed conflict and
prevent terrorist attacks 73 (military purposes).
68
Id. at 218. The term “programme” is given the following definition: “A sequence of instructions to
carry out a process in, or convertible into, a form executable by an electronic computer.” Id. at 214. A
“microprogramme” is defined as “[a] sequence of elementary instructions maintained in a special storage,
the execution of which is initiated by the introduction of its reference instruction register.” Id. at 211.
69
Mark T. Pasko, Re-Defining National Security in the Technology Age: The Encryption Export Debate,
26 J. LEGIS. 337, 337 (2000).
70
Corr, supra note 32, at 484.
71
Id. at 484 n.174 (quoting Bernadette Barnard, Leveraging Worldwide Encryption Standards via U.S.
Export Controls: The U.S. Government’s Authority to “Safeguard” the Global Information Infrastructure,
1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 433-35 (1997)).
72
See, e.g., Sophie Curtis, Small businesses urged to encrypt data after London sole trader fined £5,000,
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 26, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10336836/Smallbusinesses-urged-to-encrypt-data-after-London-sole-trader-fined-5000.html.
73
See Thinh Nguyen, Cryptography, Export Controls, and the First Amendment in Bernstein v. United
States Department of State, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 667, 668-69 (1997) (“For millennia, people have
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The potential for encryption programs to be exploited by criminal elements
galvanized many jurisdictions—including the European Union 74 and the United States75—
to regulate encryption technology exports to varying degrees. The U.S. government has
long had an exceptional interest in controlling cryptographic exports because of the role
that encryption plays in the U.S. economy 76 and the U.S. law enforcement system. 77 Thus,
Washington has long imposed severe restrictions on exports of encryption technology. 78
The U.S. lobbied to extend those restrictions beyond its borders at a 1998 Wassenaar
Arrangement meeting and was successful. As a result, the Arrangement placed encryption
technology on the dual-use list and Arrangement members specifically agreed to restrict
the export of encryption software with numerical keys above 64 bits in length. 79

employed cryptography as a tool for securing communications, and for equally as long, other people have
tried to decode those messages. During World War II, the Allies were able to break a secret German code,
called Enigma. With this capability, they were able to locate and sink large numbers of German U-boats
and obtain advanced information about German military operations that was critical to the campaign in
Europe. Similar code-breaking ability also allowed the United States Navy to intercept the Japanese fleet in
one of the most decisive battles in the Pacific—the Battle of Midway. During the Cold War, signals
intelligence provided information about the Soviet Union‘s military capabilities, the downing of Korean
Airlines Flight 007, and Libyan involvement in the bombing of the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin.
More recently, intercepted communications have been used to reveal unfair trading practices by competing
nations, monitor proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, enforce international sanctions, identify
conventional military threats, and prevent terrorism.”) (citations omitted).
74
Nathan Saper, International Cryptography Regulation and the Global Information Economy, 11 NW.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 673, 682 (2013) (“Cryptography in the European Union (EU), like in the U.S., is
free to use domestically, but faces restriction on its export.”).
75
See, e.g., Pasko, supra note 69 (“While encryption offers American industry a tremendous advantage
in conducting its business by ensuring that transactions and industrial secrets are kept safe, encryption also
offers many opportunities for misuse. Criminal activities that use encryption technology to their advantage,
such as terrorism, organized crime, and industrial espionage have prompted the federal government to enact
strong laws regulating encryption in order to prevent such misuse.”); Saper, supra note 74, at 677 (“The
United States pioneered the efforts to regulate encryption during the Cold War.”).
76
See Shotwell, supra note 34, at 339 (explaining that some financial transactions in the United States
are protected by encryption technology).
77
See Karim K. Shehadeh, The Wassenaar Arrangement and Encryption Exports: An Ineffective Export
Control Regime that Compromises United States’ Economic Interests, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 271, 283-84
(1999) (“Essentially, law enforcement advocates argue that widespread use of encryption would hamper
intelligence gathering and undermine the ability of law enforcement to prevent crime. A recently published
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) report states that ‘[e]ncryption can also be used to conceal criminal
activity and thwart law enforcement efforts to collect critical evidence needed to prevent, solve and
prosecute serious and often violent criminal activities, including illegal drug trafficking, organized crime,
child pornography, and terrorism.’ For instance, law enforcement officials cite examples where strong
encryption frustrated court-authorized crime interdiction efforts. Recent terrorist incidents also heighten
fears that strong encryption has already become a vital tool used by terrorists and drug cartels to evade
detection by law enforcement officials.”) (citations omitted).
78
See Ioannis Iglezakis, Regulation of Cryptography and Other Dual-use Goods, in CYBER LAW IN
GREECE 67, 71 (Dimitrios Maniotis, Michail-Theodoros Marinos, Apostolos Anthimos, Ioannis Iglezakis,
& George Nouskalis, eds., 2011) (“The USA has imposed severe restrictions on cryptography exports. The
export of cryptographic products was subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) until
1996 and then exports were transferred to the Department of Commerce under the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR). ITAR restricted export of ‘dual-use’ cryptography, which was included in the
munitions list.”).
79
See Shehadeh, supra note 77, at 298.
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¶20

A mere month after the meeting, however, the Arrangement’s consensus on
encryption technology began to break. The French government, citing “its desire to
improve the ability of its citizens to protect their confidential communications and its wish
to remove obstacles to the growth of e-commerce,” announced that it would drop “all
controls on encryption technology up to 128-bits.” 80 Other Arrangement members, namely
Germany and Finland, opposed any restrictions whatsoever on the export of encryption
software. 81 And, further undermining the Arrangement’s consensus, non-members with
fewer controls on encryption technology ended up benefitting from the Arrangement’s
restrictions. Switzerland, for instance, quickly became a thriving center for encryptionsoftware production. 82
¶21
Finally, because of the widespread use of the Internet, export controls on encryption
technology eventually “lost any effect.” 83 Professor Ioannis Iglezakis explains, “[S]ince
encryption programs can be downloaded from everywhere in seconds . . . it seems
impossible for countries to limit dissemination of such programs.” 84 Eventually, the
ineffectiveness of these export controls forced the United States “to rethink its encryption
priorities and develop a new strategy.” 85
¶22
The cyber amendment appears strikingly similar to the encryption-related
amendment passed in the late 1990s. That is, analogous to encryption technologies, many
of the cyber technology programs added by the recent amendment are dual-use, softwarebased products. For this reason, the failure of the Wassenaar Arrangement to control the
export of encryption software lends support to the theory that the cyber amendment will
also likely fail.
B.
¶23

Institutional Argument

The Wassenaar Arrangement’s effectiveness is seriously hindered by inadequate
enforcement rules and the lack of a ban on undercutting; both defects are rooted in the
Wassenaar Arrangement’s written guidelines. These organizational weaknesses stymie the
Arrangement’s ability to control the cross-border flow of cyber technologies.
1. Lack of Binding Enforcement Provisions

¶24

The Wassenaar Arrangement is multilateral in scope. Nevertheless, each
Arrangement member must take two distinct unilateral steps for the regime to function
properly: refrain from thwarting the enactment of collectively beneficial regulations and
refrain from disregarding collectively beneficial regulations that have already been
enacted. The Arrangement’s guiding documents contain no provisions for persuading
Pasko, supra note 69, at 351.
Shotwell, supra note 34, at 339.
82
Iglezakis, supra note 78 (“[S]ome countries (e.g., Switzerland) have benefitted from this situation by
promoting the lack of controls in their territory.). See also Shehadeh, supra note 77, at 275 (“[W]hile
United States encryption exporters were frustrated by domestic export policies that remained more
restrictive than Wassenaar, foreign manufacturers were operating in less restrictive environments.”).
83
Iglezakis, supra note 78.
84
Id. In an interconnected and globalized world, controlling the export of intangible products, including
encryption programs, is inherently difficult. See infra Part V.C.
85
Pasko, supra note 69, at 351.
80
81
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member states that are obstinate during the enactment process or for punishing member
states that refuse to abide by Arrangement regulations. Thus, the regime can be rendered
ineffectual with regard to cyber technology if (1) any member states refuse to add
previously unregulated forms of cyber technology to the Wassenaar Arrangement’s control
list of dual-use goods and technologies or (2) any member states fail to abide by the
strictures of the cyber amendment or any other Wassenaar Arrangement regulation.
¶25
Because the Wassenaar Arrangement operates on the principle that all decisions must
be supported by all members, the first unilateral step that every member state must take is
to abstain from obstructing the regime’s consensuses on controlled items and controlled
destinations. 86 In theory, the consensus-based system protects each state’s individual
interests; at the same time, the system elevates a single state’s individual interests above
the group’s collective interests. This is problematic when conflicting interests arise among
Arrangement members. The incentive to sell certain goods to certain customers, for
instance, might compel countries to act against collective interests. 87 Even the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization—which has a system of collective defense that forces at least
some alignment in the political and security interests of member states—is not immune to
individual economic motivations taking precedence over other considerations; the French
government’s initial reluctance to cancel its €1.2 billion contract to sell helicopter assault
ships to Russia, despite pleas from France’s NATO allies following the downing of
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine, 88 was only the latest
and most high-profile example of this incentive in action.
¶26
The second unilateral step that every Wassenaar Arrangement member takes is to put
the regime’s consensus-based, collectively agreed-upon control lists into action. Much like
the prior step, this is ultimately a matter of discretion. That is, the Arrangement’s guiding
documents guarantee that “[t]he decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item will be
the sole responsibility of each Participating State. . . . All measures undertaken . . . will be
in accordance with national legislation and policies and will be implemented on the basis
of national discretion.” 89 But since the Arrangement’s written guidelines do not include
any enforcement mechanisms, the Arrangement imposes “no obligation on its signatories
to enact domestic legislation consistent with its provisions.” 90 Furthermore, even if a
member state chooses to pass laws that effectuate the purposes of the Arrangement, that
member state faces no penalty from the Arrangement for failing to enforce those laws. This
point is encapsulated by the following conversation between Connecticut Senator Joseph
Lieberman and the U.S. State Department’s Senior Advisor for Arms Control and
International Security John Holum during a congressional hearing on the Wassenaar
Arrangement:
See supra Part III (explaining the Wassenaar Arrangement’s consensus-based decision-making
system).
87
See infra Part V.C.1 (discussing the economic incentives underlying state behavior).
88
See Hugh Carnegy & Peter Spiegel, Row erupts over French warship ahead of European sanctions
talks, FIN. TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/36d15660-1163-11e4-a17a00144feabdc0.html. Note that France decided to suspend delivery of the helicopter assault ships in late
2014 when the situation in Ukraine worsened. See Stacy Meichtry & Gregory L. White, France Suspends
Delivery of Warship to Russia, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/france-haltsplans-to-deliver-warship-to-russia-1416919199.
89
Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, supra note 52, at 3.
90
Shehadeh, supra note 77, at 297.
86
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Senator Lieberman[:] Help me understand. When a nation, when a member
Nation of Wassenaar violates the agreement by exporting an item on the
agreed upon list, what are the sanctions that are possible?
Mr. Holum[:] Well, there are no sanctions because ultimately the decision
making belongs to the countries. 91
¶27

With member states free to choose whether to enact controls on listed items and free
to choose whether to enforce any enacted controls, reaching a consensus on controlled
items and controlled destinations—the first unilateral action described above—turns out to
be of little consequence. By virtue of their membership in the Wassenaar Arrangement,
members are not bound to do anything at all. In this light, the Arrangement is nothing more
than an organization for sharing information about export controls without the institutional
teeth to actually control exports.
2. Lack of a Rule Forbidding Undercutting

¶28

a) Undercutting Explained.—Unlike the other three multilateral export control
regimes, the guidelines governing the Wassenaar Arrangement do not incorporate a rule
forbidding undercutting, or a “no undercut rule,” 92 which would prohibit members of an
export control regime from exporting “any listed item or items that had been officially
denied an export license by another member.” 93 Professor Daniel Joyner explains the
importance of such a rule:
When a denial of an export license for an item on a control list is made at
the national level, member states under this rule are to notify the regime.
This is a crucial element in ensuring member states that the restrictive
policies of the regime will not be abrogated to the financial gain of one or a
few members, to the corresponding loss of the remainder of member states
whose positions have thereby been undercut and to the mooting of regime
principles. 94

¶29

In lieu of a proper no undercut rule for dual-use goods like cyber technology, the
Wassenaar Arrangement provides for notification procedures. These procedures are
primarily described in three paragraphs: paragraph 4 of section II and paragraphs 1 and 2
of section V. Paragraph 4 of section II spells out the steps that member states must take in
notifying other members about denials of export requests:

The Wassenaar Arrangement and the Future of Multilateral Export Controls: Hearing before the
United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg64899/html/CHRG-106shrg64899.htm.
92
Joyner, supra note 35, at 185 n.8 (“The Wassenaar Arrangement is the only one of the [four
multilateral export control] regimes without these denial notification/no undercut policies.”).
93
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1095, EXPORT CONTROLS: CHALLENGES WITH
COMMERCE’S VALIDATED END-USER PROGRAM MAY LIMIT ITS ABILITY TO ENSURE THAT
SEMICONDUCTOR EQUIPMENT EXPORTED TO CHINA IS USED AS INTENDED 10 (2008).
94
Joyner, supra note 35, at 185 (emphasis added).
91
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4. In accordance with the provisions of this Arrangement, Participating
States agree to notify transfers and denials. These notifications will apply
to all nonparticipating states. However, in the light of the general and
specific information exchange, the scope of these notifications, as well as
their relevance for the purposes of the Arrangement, will be reviewed.
Notification of a denial will not impose an obligation on other Participating
States to deny similar transfers. However, a Participating State will notify,
preferably within 30 days, but no later than within 60 days, all other
Participating States of an approval of a licence which has been denied by
another Participating State for an essentially identical transaction during the
last three years. 95
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of section V provide additional procedural instructions regarding
notifications:
1. Participating States will notify licences denied to non-participants with
respect to items on the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, where
the reasons for denial are relevant to the purposes of the Arrangement.
2. For the Dual-Use List, Participating States will notify all licences denied
relevant to the purposes of the Arrangement to non-participating states, on
an aggregate basis, twice per year. 96
Conspicuously missing from the three cited paragraphs is a rule forbidding member states
from exporting dual-use items to a recipient after receiving notification that a fellow
Arrangement member denied that recipient an export license. The closest the guidelines
come to such a rule is the “essentially identical transaction” provision in paragraph 4 of
section II, and that provision is extremely limited in nature: it only applies to sensitive
items and it only mandates notification—not denial—within a maximum of 60 days after
a license approval. 97
¶30
b. Undercutting in Action.—A no undercut rule’s impact is illustrated best via
hypothetical. Suppose a multilateral export control regime called the “Lumber Control
Regime” is created to control the export of lumber. Suppose further that a type of lumber
called “olivewood” falls within a category of the Lumber Control Regime’s control list.
Finally, suppose the countries of “Woodland” and “Timberstan” are founding members of
Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, supra note 52, at 3.
Id. at 5.
97
See GRIMMETT, supra note 55, at 5 (“The Arrangement does not prohibit a participating country from
making an export to a particular destination that has been denied by another participant (this practice is
called ‘undercutting’). But participants are required to notify other participants within 60 days, and
preferably within 30 days, after they approve a license for an export of sensitive dual-use goods that are
essentially identical to those that have been denied by another participant during the previous three years.“).
See also Jaffer, supra note 49, at 521-522 (“[T]he Wassenaar Arrangement contains only the weakest of
provisions to assist member nations in ensuring that their export license denials are not undercut by other
member nations. The no undercut provisions contained in the Wassenaar Arrangement require member
nations to provide information about exports they deny, as well as notification when a member transfers
technology or goods that are essentially identical to products denied by other members.”) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
95
96
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the Lumber Control Regime but the country of “Pariahguay” is deliberately excluded from
membership because it is widely considered to be a state sponsor of terrorism. When a
Woodland company applies to the Woodland government for a license to export olivewood
to Pariahguay and the Woodland government rejects the company’s application, the
existence of a no undercut rule matters a great deal. With a no undercut rule in place,
Woodland’s subsequent notification of the rejection forbids all members of the Lumber
Control Regime from exporting olivewood to Pariahguay. Without a no undercut rule,
however, Woodland’s notification becomes a notification—if not an advertisement—that
Pariahguayan companies seek to import olivewood. Most importantly, nothing precludes
Timberstani political leaders from approving the applications of Timberstani companies
eager to export olivewood to Pariahguay. Woodland’s rejection of an export license could
thereby facilitate the derogation of the Lumber Control Regime’s principles.
¶31
As demonstrated in the above hypothetical, the absence of a no undercut rule works
against the Wassenaar Arrangement because “[a] country denying an export license
essentially notifies all other members of a sales opportunity.” 98 Accordingly, this situation
“may actually create a perverse incentive for the denying member to decline to report the
denial because of the concern that it will simply be providing other members with an export
opportunity.” 99 No wonder the Arrangement currently receives “scant attention from the
policy community” and “ridicule from the arms lobby.” 100
C.
¶32

Theoretical Argument

There are three theoretical reasons that the cyber amendment to the Wassenaar
Arrangement will fail to stifle the dissemination of destabilizing cyber products. First,
member states and companies in those member states are incentivized to sell exports—
such as cyber products—to as many buyers as possible. Second, keeping cyber technology
within a nation or group of nations will be problematic as advances in the technology are
made in an increasingly borderless world. Third, the intangibility inherent in software
products makes it well-nigh impossible to control their flow across borders.
1. Economic Incentives Motivate Governments and Private Actors to Ignore the Cyber
Amendment

¶33

The Wassenaar Arrangement’s unenforceability 101 renders it dependent on the
voluntary compliance of governments and businesses. 102 The private sector did not always

Michael D. Klaus, Dual-Use Free Trade Agreements: The Contemporary Alternative to High-Tech
Export Controls, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 105, 115 (2003) (citation omitted).
99
Jaffer, supra note 49, at 522.
100
William W. Keller & Janne E. Nolan, Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Threat to Stability, in
THE GLOBAL CENTURY: GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 785, 800-01 (Richard L. Kugler &
Ellen L. Frost eds., 2002).
101
See supra Part V.B.1 (describing the Wassenaar Arrangement‘s enforceability problems).
102
See Heinz Gartner, The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA): How it is Broken and Needs to be Fixed, 24
DEF. & SEC. ANALYSIS 53, 54 (2008) (“The WA is not a traditional arms control and disarmament
agreement, as it is not legally binding on the state parties. Enforcement relies on co-operation and voluntary
compliance, with governments and industries representing the two most important actors in the agreement’s
dynamics.”).
98
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play a significant role in dual-use technology innovation, as Professors William Keller and
Janne Nolan explain:
From the 1950s at least through the 1970s, the lead investor in
communications, computers, and semiconductors in the United States was
the Department of Defense. Pentagon research and development accounted
for some of the most significant technical advances, such as
supercomputers, geosynchronous satellites, and integrated circuitry. Strict
government controls over research and development minimized
unregulated technological diffusion and formed the basis for restrictive
instruments such as export controls and supplier cartels. Today, this
situation is reversed. 103
Concerning this reversal, Professor Joyner further explains:
[P]roduction of dual use technologies has shifted in large degree to elements
of the private sector, as national governments have found that higher quality
and lower prices are available ‘off the shelf’ in private markets. This shift
has had the result of significantly decentralizing the production of sensitive
items and requiring increased coordination between the private and public
spheres. 104
As both government institutions and private sector institutions are integrally involved in
the development of dual-use technology, their collaboration is a sine qua non for
controlling exports of that technology. In other words, for an export control regime like the
Wassenaar Arrangement to work, companies seeking to export certain items must apply to
their national governments for export licenses and only proceed with sales upon receiving
licenses. However, controlling exports this way is extraordinarily difficult because
impeding sales in foreign markets runs counter to the interests of all of all parties involved,
especially private sector businesses. That is, Wassenaar Arrangement member states—
which are individually responsible for controlling exports but are themselves incentivized
to violate the Agreement and allow as many exports as possible—must rely on the
cooperation of profit-seeking private sector companies with essentially unbalanced
incentives to sidestep the Agreement.
¶34
The mostly democratic and mostly capitalist members of the Wassenaar
Arrangement face a strategic trade-off when it comes to export controls. On the one hand,
national leaders are motivated to protect their nations’ security by curtailing the movement
of potentially dangerous technologies. On the other hand, national leaders are motivated
to minimize regulations that hamper the economic activities of tax-paying companies that
employ members of their electorates. 105 These two conflicting incentives are apparent in
Keller & Nolan, supra note 100, at 786.
Joyner, supra note 35, at 186.
105
See, e.g., Collins, supra note 44, at 108 (“Export controls, through the implementation of domestic
policy and by participation in international agreements, evoke the importance of a nation’s most delicate
balancing act: national security vs. economic competitiveness.”). Note that there may not necessarily be a
contradiction between a country pursuing its security interests and its economic interests simultaneously
when exporting defense and dual-use items. See Michael Hirsh, The Great Technology Giveaway?,
103
104
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the actions taken by Arrangement members, who claim that they are “willing to support
general WA [Wassenaar Arrangement] guidelines that address the concerns of all
countries” but nevertheless “consistently and simultaneously oppose specific controls that
might negatively impact their own export policies and decisions.” 106
¶35
That same strategic trade-off does not apply to businesses, which have no need to
appeal to a security-sensitive electorate. Instead, for-profit enterprises generally seek to
earn money for the benefit of owners or shareholders. 107 Private sector prioritization of
profits is intuitive, has been borne out innumerable times by the actions of businesses,108
and is especially true now that the existential threat posed by the Cold War heating up has
vanished. 109 In fact, businesses are subject to such compelling economic incentives that,
when faced with regulations akin to the cyber amendment, many might simply relocate to
jurisdictions with fewer regulations. Due to globalization, businesses “set up shop
wherever capital, labor, and market destinations make the most economic sense.” 110
¶36
Software companies that produce dual-use cyber technology can easily exploit the
fact that programs can be sent to customers from any place with a functional Internet
connection. Moreover, a software company’s only two indispensable factors of production
are computers and qualified personnel; since neither factor is inordinately difficult to move
across borders, software companies face relatively low transfer costs. These companies are
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 1998, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54383/michael-hirsh/the-greattechnology-giveaway (“The idea that national security and commercial interests trade off—that every time
you sell a satellite overseas, you make a profit but lose a little bit of your military edge—harks back to a
time when CIA bean counters worried over every uptick in Soviet technology, and when the U.S. defense
industry was sequestered in top-secret grandeur, spending untold billions on weapons designed exclusively
for the Pentagon, with older generation models going to America’s Cold War allies. Today the situation
could not be more different.”) Some have even argued that an exporting country’s security interests and
economic interests go hand in hand. See Corr, supra note 32, at 444 n.3 (“Many in the Clinton
Administration, including the Defense Department, recognized that the military increasingly relies on
technological superiority, and that the civilian commercial sector, not the military industrial sector, drives
technology. That sector, in turn, is increasingly dependent on exports. It is therefore tautological that for
export control purposes you cannot at once strangle and promote the source of your technological
superiority.”) (citations omitted).
106
Gartner, supra note 102, at 55.
107
See, e.g., id. (“Although the WA export control list could provide guidelines for future export
decisions and export conduct for both state and non-state actors, it has little impact on specific export
decisions. These remain largely driven by profit, growth, and investment opportunities. The main private
actors involved in the WA—the exporting companies—remain vehemently opposed to the strict
enforcement of effective export control measures.”).
108
See, e.g., Jing-Dong Yuan, The Future of Export Controls: Developing New Strategies for
Nonproliferation, 39 INT’L POLICY 131, 142 (2002) (“In certain cases, companies may simply disregard the
implications of their technology transfers and, indeed, may cheat to obtain export licenses that allow a
business advantage over potential competitors. For instance, in the late 1980s, a number of West German
companies were found guilty of illegal exports of nuclear, chemical, and rocket items and relevant
technologies to Middle Eastern countries, including Libya.”) (citation omitted).
109
See, e.g., Hirsh, supra note 105 (describing how, in the post-Cold War era, American exporters such
as Hughes Electronics, AT&T, Loral Space & Communications, and United Technologies carried out
“intense corporate lobbying“ to pressure the U.S. government to reclassify certain munitions as dual-use
items and thereby simplify and expedite the export process for those items); Keller & Nolan, supra note
100, at 797 (noting that, following the Cold War, the desire of businesses “to sell into international markets
has slowly but irresistibly taken precedence [over concerns about the diffusion of advanced technology].”).
110
Yuan, supra note 108, at 141; see also infra Part V.C.2 (describing the behavior of companies in an
increasingly globalized world).
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therefore well positioned to conduct regulatory arbitrage by moving their operations
whenever they reassess their regulatory cost-benefit analyses. 111 In fact, this is precisely
what happened when the Wassenaar Arrangement placed strict controls on dual-use
encryption technologies; over time, production of encryption software “thrived in countries
with fewer controls.” 112
¶37
Thus, the two actors tasked with carrying out the directives of the Wassenaar
Arrangement—the governments of Arrangement members and the private sector actors
doing business in member states—are subject to strong incentives to disregard those
directives. And, in practice, “aggressive and effective lobbying” by export-oriented
companies has made member states progressively more tolerant of the fact that those
companies openly flout many of the Arrangement’s regulations. 113
2. Innovations in Cyber Technology Will Occur in a Globalized World
¶38

a. Whither Borders?—All export control regimes presuppose the existence of
borders; the term “export” is meaningless in a borderless world. Consequently, as borders
shrink in terms of significance, export control regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement
will likewise shrink in terms of significance. And borders are indeed shrinking; the world
economy is currently characterized by, inter alia, the “globalization of business” and “rapid
technological innovation.” 114 These two phenomena mutually and continually reinforce
one another: technological innovations fuel increased globalization, increased
globalization fuels yet more technological innovations, and so on. The speed and extent of
technological innovation, most notably in the realm of communication, has transformed
the global economy. Only historical comparison elucidates the sheer magnitude of
technology’s impact:
In 1830, for instance, it would have cost around $2,000 of today’s money
to transmit one letter from London to India, and it could have taken up to
six months to reach its destination. Today, a letter can be shipped
internationally for $3 and reach its destination in only a few days. Going
beyond that, the world is flush with near-instantaneous communication of
all kinds, from tweets to SMS texts, and from instant messenger software to
Note that seemingly immovable factors of production, such as factories, may also be moved across
borders with relative ease. Jan Clenski, Moving with the times: Factory relocation forms basis for business
model, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/645e407c-f05e-11df-88db00144feab49a.html. Nevertheless, a company that does not rely on any immovable assets is at least
theoretically freer to relocate abroad than a company that does rely on immovable assets because the
former literally has fewer things to transport.
112
Iglezakis, supra note 78; see also Shehadeh, supra note 77, at 300-01 (“[S]tringent United States
laws have led to a significant increase in the amount of encryption products that are available from foreign
manufacturers. For instance, The Arrangement does not require members to control the intangible export of
encryption software in cyberspace. In the United States, however, current regulations restrict the
distribution of encryption software via the Internet. The foregoing has allowed software manufacturers
from newly emerging countries to make their encryption software available over the Internet, and establish
a reputation for security that United States-exported products cannot match in foreign markets.”).
113
Gartner, supra note 102, at 55.
114
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-43, NONPROLIFERATION: STRATEGY NEEDED TO
STRENGTHEN MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES 24 (2002).
111
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calls via VoIP (voice-over Internet protocol). Technological change means
not only that most types of global flows are growing in volume but also that
global networks of flows are evolving more rapidly. As a result, the world
is increasingly connected and dynamic—and potentially more volatile. 115
The connectedness, dynamism, and potential volatility described above apply to cyber
technologies, which, as a result of innovation and globalization, can currently be exported
in myriad ways. For instance, technologies may be “exported” by shipping data storage
devices abroad, traveling with data storage devices, transmitting data via the Internet,
allowing foreigners access to data inside of the exporting country, and allowing foreigners
and non-foreigners access to data outside of the exporting country. 116 Since controlling
exports is naturally harder when the exporting process takes so many forms, globalization
presents a formidable procedural challenge to export controls. On a more fundamental
level, however, globalization poses a conceptual challenge to export controls. With borders
becoming “porous” and technologies and information become “more transportable,” the
inevitable result is that the “the underlying assumptions of programs to stem the flow of
dual-use technologies and commodities come under question.” 117
¶39
b. Multinational Companies and Multinational Teams—Multinationalism has long
been the order of the day for many tech companies in terms of producing and selling
products and services. In recent years, research and development in high tech has likewise
become a global affair. It is hardly news that companies like Sweden’s Ericsson, France’s
Alcatel-Lucent, South Korea’s Samsung, America’s Motorola, and Germany’s Siemens
outsource manufacture operations to places like China, India, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico,
and Thailand. 118 Relatively unknown, however, is the fact that businesses use foreign
countries as sites for innovation too; all five companies mentioned, for instance, have
research campuses in China. 119 San Jose-based eBay has an innovation hub in Tel Aviv.120
Microsoft, a company headquartered in Redmond, Washington, boasts a research
laboratory in Bangalore. 121 To inspire Google employees to be innovative no matter where
they sit, the company provides perks like “ski gondolas in the Zurich office, a pub-like
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, GLOBAL FLOWS IN A DIGITAL AGE: HOW TRADE, FINANCE, PEOPLE,
AND DATA CONNECT THE WORLD ECONOMY 20 (2014),
115

http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights/Globalization/Global%20flows%20in%20a
%20digital%20age/MGI_Global_flows_in_a_digial_age_Full_report.ashx (citations omitted).
116
See Corr, supra note 32, at 472-73. See also Keller & Nolan, supra note 100, at 785 (“Technological
change is transforming the context of international security and commerce. The rapid expansion of crossborder trade and the free flow of intellectual as well as financial capital brought on by technological
advances have made our national borders porous.”).
117
Shotwell, supra note 34, at 336.
118
See THEODORE MORAN, DEALING WITH CYBERSECURITY THREATS POSED BY GLOBALIZED
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIERS 3 (2013), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb13-11.pdf.
119
See id.
120
Improving the Customer Experience, LEADERS,
http://www.leadersmag.com/issues/2014.3_Jul/Entrepreneurship/LEADERS-Dafan-Gura-GoldenbergParnes-Matalon-Schory-eBay.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (“The Israel Innovation Center (IIC) is a selfcontained, off-platform team based in Tel Aviv, Israel…The IIC is part of the newly formed Innovation and
New Ventures group, created to act as the center of innovation, which includes creating new businesses,
and supporting the eBay Marketplaces businesses and eBay Inc. at a corporate level.”).
121
Dinesh C. Sharma, Microsoft Research goes to Bangalore, CNET NEWS, Jan. 12, 2005,
http://news.cnet.com/Microsoft-Research-goes-to-Bangalore/2100-1008_3-5533395.html.
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meeting room in Dublin, and [a] sidewalk cafe in Istanbul.” 122 When innovation occurs
transnationally, as it now apparently does, it is hard to pin down the nation to which the
fruits of innovators’ labors belong. Should source code written in the Lima office of a
London-based company be considered a Peruvian or British export?
¶40
At first blush, “rules of origin” offer a tempting solution to the above question
because those rules are often used to investigate trade issues, such as “whether a shipment
falls within a quota limitation, qualifies for a tariff preference or is affected by an antidumping duty.” 123 In the Wassenaar Arrangement context, however, rules of origin provide
less guidance because the rules “vary from country to country.” 124 Given the Wassenaar
Arrangement’s focus on national discretion, each of the forty-one members is presumably
responsible for classifying a given product for export control purposes pursuant to that
country’s rules of origin. Using this approach to determine the origin of a product that
originates from more than one country, however, “can be very complex, sometimes
subjective, and time-consuming.” 125
¶41
The process becomes all the more complex, subjective, and time-consuming when
the teams that produce an item are themselves multinational. Ever-improving technology
allows companies like eBay, Microsoft, and Google to “pick the best brains from anywhere
in a global organisation and set them working together in cyberspace.” 126 Multinational
teams add an additional layer of complexity to export issues because a product is
sometimes considered to have been exported to a foreign country the moment that a foreign
national is given access to it. This type of export, called a “deemed export,” is a “legal
fiction” that is “based on the assumption that conveying information to a foreign national
will result in the information being relayed to that national’s home country.” 127 The deemed
export rule can be activated in a variety of settings:
[The settings] range from allowing a foreign national to inspect a product
or technical data, to having a conversation with a foreign national. However,
the [deemed export] rule applies not only to actual releases, but also to
possible releases: if a foreign employee can access a controlled commodity,
software, or technology, it could qualify as a deemed export regardless of
whether the employee actually accessed the information. 128
Given the “intangible, amorphous nature of deemed transfers,” exporting countries with an
operational deemed export rule face “special hazards and difficulties” due to the
“increasing use of internal company e-mail servers, or intranets, where proprietary data is
Inside Google workplaces, from perks to nap pods, CBS NEWS, Jan. 22, 2013,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-google-workplaces-from-perks-to-nap-pods/.
123
WTO.COM, Glossary, Rules of Origin,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/rules_of_origin_e.htm.
124
Id.
125
VIVIAN C. JONES & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34524, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: RULES OF ORIGIN 1 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34524.pdf.
126
Alicia Clegg, Tactics for remote teamwork, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/77c904b6-51b1-11e1-a99d-00144feabdc0.html.
127
Joseph A. Schoorl, Clicking the “Export” Button: Cloud Data Storage and U.S. Dual-Use Export
Controls, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632, 640-41 (2012).
128
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
122
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shared among employees, and broad company computer networks where a foreign national
may gain access to controlled data and files.” 129 Although the rule is not in place in all
jurisdictions, it is a factor in certain large export markets such as the United States.130
Describing the challenges U.S.-based technology companies face because of the deemed
export rule, Professors Ron Smith and Bernard Udis write:
It is now common for U.S. software engineers to work on a program during
the day, beam it by satellite to India, Israel, or Russia, where another team
works on it during the U.S. night and passes it back the next morning.
Controlling such technology transfer raises obvious difficulties for
traditional export control mechanisms. 131
¶42

As increasingly multinational teams in multiple offices of multinational firms
collaborate on high-tech products like cyber technology, determining a country of origin
for those products—or even figuring out the precise moment that those products have been
exported if the deemed export rule applies—will become arbitrary if not altogether
impossible. Suppose a source code is written by a team of Canadian, Kenyan, and Japanese
nationals working together in the Lima office of a London-based company. If the Canadian
writes the code, and then asks his Japanese colleague to review it, and the Japanese
colleague subsequently shows the code to their Kenyan teammate, how many times has the
code been exported and which country’s export rules apply? Is the answer different if the
three of them jointly generate the code instead of passing it to one another for editing? A
rule that assigns the finished source code to one or another of the five countries would
require so much willful ignorance of the other four de facto origins as to be irredeemable.
¶43
c. Mass Collaboration—Cross-border collaborations are not limited to the private
sector; in more informal environments, people from all over the world use the Internet to
collectively generate a variety of things, including software. Professor Yochai Benkler
teaches that despite the enduring belief that rational individuals act out of narrowly-defined
self-interests, the advent of open-source software in recent years has shown that thousands
of volunteers collaborating on a “complex economic project” are capable of “beat[ing] the
largest and best-financed business enterprises in the world at their own game.” 132 Increased
Corr, supra note 32, at 475.
Collins, supra note 44, at 110 (“In addition to regulating the more traditional exportation of tangible
goods, the EAR [Export Administration Regulations] encompasses the more abstract concept of intangible
technology releases through the Deemed Export Rule (DER). Despite no formal recognition until 1996,
releases of controlled technology to foreign nationals working inside U.S. borders are subject to DER
export controls. The DER is not supported by legislative language, a fact recognized in the Congressional
debates over reauthorization. The DER stands for the proposition that a legal, foreign worker in the U.S.
exposed to controlled technology subject to the EAR has imported that technology to his or her home
country solely by virtue of their exposure.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Corr,
supra note 32, at 473 (“U.S. companies should be aware that controlled transactions may occur when they
hire foreign nationals and allow them access to controlled technology. This type of transfer is termed a
“deemed export” because the foreigner’s access to the controlled technology is deemed to be a restricted
transfer to the foreigner’s country of citizenship.”).
131
Smith & Udis, supra note 31, at 87.
132
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L. J. 369, 371
(2002). See also MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note 115, at 42 (“Open-source software projects are
an example of the power of online collaboration tools to enable complex collaboration among participants
129
130
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connectivity, made possible by computer communications networks that have become
“faster, cheaper, and more ubiquitous,” has brought about “a dramatic change in the scope,
scale, and efficacy of peer production.” 133 The era of mass collaboration, it seems, has
arrived.
¶44
It is difficult to grasp the concept of mass collaboration without an example. The
McKinsey Global Institute offers Apache as a case study in which “open-source
collaborators are distributed around the globe and rarely, if ever, work in person.”134
According to McKinsey, a single Apache project in which “nearly 400 people provided
code and identified close to 3,000 bugs” is evidence of “the immense sophistication and
potential of online collaboration tools.” 135 McKinsey also notes that Apache is “the most
widely deployed web server.” 136 Putting aside the laudable sophistication and significant
potential value of these types of projects, the hundreds of geographically dispersed
collaborators behind a piece of open-source software like Apache make meaningful
country of origin identification—let alone export control—into an exercise in futility.
¶45
Admittedly, the dual-use technologies targeted by the cyber amendment, such as
intrusion software, do not include web servers like Apache. In principle, however, source
code for an intrusion program can just as easily be created, shared, and jointly improved
upon as source code for a program like Apache. Any attempt to control the export of an
intrusion program—or any controlled cyber technology—would need to comprehensively
address the fact that when a single item is the product of individuals located in hundreds
of places, it is more the product of our borderless planet than the product of any given
country.
¶46
d. Cloud Computing—The complications generated by transnational collaborative
teams are exponentially compounded by cloud computing, which is already considered
“vital to the success of billions of individuals, businesses and entire economies.” 137 The
“cloud” consists of “a vast network of large computers called servers” 138 that can be located
“anywhere in the world with adequate electricity and Internet connectivity.” 139 Purchasing
cloud services does not entail purchasing a set of physical servers; rather, consumers
purchase a “virtual machine” that “behaves like a physical computer but actually utilizes
resources from numerous interconnected servers.” 140 Crucially, information in the cloud
“is automatically allocated to different servers based on a number of factors, and these
allocations generally occur without the knowledge of providers or users.” 141 The cloud
“can be accessed through any Internet-enabled computer” and “it can also be hacked into
from anywhere.” 142
in multiple locations.”)
133
Benkler, supra note 132, at 383.
134
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note 115, at 42 (citation omitted).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, PROMOTING CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS: PRIORITIES
FOR THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY 2 (2011),
http://www.nftc.org/default/Innovation/PromotingCrossBorderDataFlowsNFTC.pdf.
138
Schoorl, supra note 127, at 635.
139
Id. at 645.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 635.
142
Id. at 637.
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Perpetually and imperceptibly moving data in the cloud turns the entire current
export control paradigm on its head. With electricity and Internet access spreading to every
corner of the globe and with users and providers of cloud services mostly unaware of server
locations or data movements, data in the cloud will eventually become functionally
omnipresent. Imagine if the Canadian, Kenyan, and Japanese programmers in that Lima
office of a London-based company store their source code in the cloud. If the source code
is a multinational product that exists everywhere at once, what impact could the cyber
amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement possibly have on that code’s ultimate
destination?
3. Cyber Technology’s Intangibility Makes Control Especially Challenging

¶48

The cyber amendment added two types of software to the Wassenaar Arrangement
control list. 143 Since software is defined by the Arrangement as an expression of
instructions that direct the actions of a computer, 144 the cyber amendment put export
controls over a specific type of information. The problems inherent in controlling
information make the cyber amendment particularly unlikely to be effective.
¶49
As a preliminary matter, cyber technology is based on data and is therefore
completely unlike the scores of tangible dual-use products that the Wassenaar Arrangement
controls. The latter can be physically inspected at a border. The former comprises
knowledge and speech in the form of strings of numbers and letters; these intangible
technologies can be transferred via intangible mediums of transfer such as telephone calls,
emails, and face-to-face conversations between individuals holding disparate passports.
Designed to manage tangible exports, conventional methods of export control can do little
to prevent the spread of information from one person to another.
¶50
In particular, the advent of modern technology has decimated the odds of information
remaining confidential over time. Steven Levy, a journalist who focuses on privacy and
technology, explains why:
The telegraph, telephone, radio, and especially the computer have put
everyone on the globe within earshot—at the price of our privacy. It may
feel like we’re performing an intimate act when, sequestered in our rooms
and cubicles, we casually use our cell phones and computers to transmit our
thoughts, confidences, business plans, and even our money. But clever
eavesdroppers, and sometimes even not-so-clever ones, can hear it all. We
think we’re whispering, but we’re really broadcasting. 145
Levy may be referring to the difficulties modernity has created for those wishing to keep
personal data private, but his insights are applicable to secrets of any nature, including
source code. Put simply: efforts to hold back the dissemination of sought-after information
inevitably founder. For instance, despite the millions of dollars that the Kremlin poured
143
See supra Part IV (describing the two types of software that the cyber amendment added to the
Wassenaar Arrangement).
144
See supra Part IV (providing the Wassenaar Arrangement’s definitions of “software,” “programme,”
and “microprogramme”).
145
STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT SAVING PRIVACY IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 1 (2001).
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into its efforts to silence foreign—especially Western—radio broadcasts in the Soviet
Union, 146 the masses invariably obtained access to news from beyond the Iron Curtain. In
1967, Soviet Jews famously found ways to bypass government jamming and ended up
“glued to their radios” as they listened to BBC and Voice of America broadcasts about
Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War. 147 Just as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics failed
to stop information from penetrating its borders in the 1960s, so too the Islamic Republic
of Iran failed to keep information from escaping its borders in the 2000s. Following Iran’s
disputed 2009 presidential election, Tehran’s army of cyber-censors could not hide facts,
images, or even videos about the regime’s gruesome crackdown on protesters from the rest
of the world. 148 Not even the legendary Iranian Internet blockade 149 could stand in the way
of information speeding down the information superhighway. But data need not be
controversial or momentous to be infectious; the numbers and letters behind software
programs are as shareable as any news story. After all, packets of computer code are a form
of knowledge and, as The Economist rightly posits, “[a]ttempting to stop people from
generating and spreading knowledge is futile.” 150
VI. CONCLUSION
¶51

Flawed as it may be, the December 2013 amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement
leaves room for measured optimism for at least three reasons.
¶52
First, the Wassenaar Arrangement’s successes and failures must be understood in
context. The Wassenaar Arrangement is merely an arrangement; it is not and has never
been a binding treaty. The Arrangement’s non-binding characteristics put it closer to “soft
law” than “hard law” on the spectrum of international legalization, and it was precisely this
softness that facilitated the compromises that were required to bring the Arrangement into
existence in the first place. 151
George W. Woodard, Cold War Radio Jamming, in COLD WAR BROADCASTING: IMPACT ON THE
SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE 51, 53 (A. Ross Johnson & R. Eugene Parta eds., 2010) (“In 1948,
the Soviet Union commenced significant jamming of VOA and BBC broadcasts. This jamming had
increased almost tenfold by the time jamming ended in 1988. Approximately 200 local and distant (skywave) jamming transmitters, with a total output power of approximately three-four megawatts in 1952, had
grown by 1988 to approximately 1700 transmitters with an estimated total output power of 45 megawatts
[…] Operating these transmitters 24 hours per day at an estimated electrical cost of $0.06 per kilowatt-hour
amounted to an operational cost of $48 million per year for electricity alone (assuming 50% transmitter
efficiency), not including operational and maintenance labor costs, or capital costs. What started in 1948 as
jamming of only VOA and BBC had grown by 1988 to include…Deutsche Welle, Kol Israel, Radio Korea,
Radio Vatican, Radio Netherlands, and others.”).
147
Yaacov Ro’i, The Soviet Jewish Reaction to the Six Day War, in THE SOVIET UNION AND THE JUNE
1967 SIX DAY WAR 251, 254 (Yaacov Ro’i & Boris Morozov eds., 2008).
148
See Brian Stetler & Brad Stone, Web Pries Lid of Iranian Censorship, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/world/middleeast/23censor.html.
149
See Declan McCullagh, Iranians find ways to bypass Net censors, CNET NEWS, June 18, 2009,
http://www.cnet.com/news/iranians-find-ways-to-bypass-net-censors/.
150
Cyber-security: The digital arms trade, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21574478-market-software-helps-hackers-penetrate-computersystems-digital-arms-trade.
151
See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L
ORG. 421, 445 (2000). Professors Abbott and Snidal explain:
The 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement for national controls on exports of conventional
146
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Second, the multilateral dialogue that the Arrangement stimulates is no small fry.
Cyber threats know no borders and, accordingly, any effort to defend against them within
national boundaries simply makes no sense. Export control regimes like the Wassenaar
Arrangement are “important promulgators of multilateral norms.” 152 These norms are an
invaluable tool for pressuring both members and non-members into complying with regime
regulations. Indeed, nonproliferation experts praise multilateral export control regimes for
“helping set international standards for limiting exports of sensitive items and helping stem
proliferation in particular countries of concern.” 153
¶54
Finally, expectations about the Wassenaar Arrangement are so low—the former head
of the Wassenaar Secretariat once declared that although the Arrangement has not yielded
any “spectacular results,” the situation would be worse without it 154—that there is little
chance that the Arrangement has duped or will dupe anybody into a false sense of security.
¶55
For these reasons, the striking mismatch between the cyber dangers we are facing
and the limited potential of the December 2013 amendment to protect us should not be a
cause for alarm. 155 It should be a call to action. Notwithstanding the lessons of history, not
all forms of cyber technology are doomed to go the way of encryption programs. Collective
action by members of the international community created the Wassenaar Arrangement in
the first place; with still more collective action, the Arrangement’s organizational
shortcomings can be remedied. Even theoretical challenges, ever a thorn in the side of
regulatory schemes, can be managed—to some extent at least—with sufficient creativity.
Boundless determination, rather than hopeless fatalism, is the only option we have to
protect ourselves. The cyber amendment was a step in the right direction. Having an
umbrella in a hurricane is better than having nothing at all.

weapons and dual-use technologies illustrates the use of soft legalization to facilitate
compromise….The United States pressed for a new institution to address post–Cold War
security threats like terrorism, regional conflicts, and arms buildups by rogue nations like
Iraq. But it faced several barriers to agreement: nearly twice as many nations would have
to take part; the ‘common enemy’ of the Cold War no longer existed; the participating
nations had very different attitudes toward particular countries and conflicts; the
economic costs of export controls would fall unevenly across countries; and some states
were more technically prepared than others to operate a sophisticated export control
system. The nonbinding ‘arrangement’ overcame these barriers by incorporating
substantial flexibility in all three elements of legalization.
Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, Professors Abbott and Snidal posit that, besides its tendency to
enable compromise between states, soft law is superior to hard law because it “offers more effective ways
to deal with uncertainty, especially when it initiates processes that allow actors to learn about the impact of
agreements over time.” Id. at 423.
152
Joyner, supra note 35, at 184-85.
153
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 93, at 7.
154
Id. at 8.
155
Indeed, although cyber threats should not be underestimated, it is vital not to overstate the imminence
or magnitude of those threats. Scaremongering helps no one. See generally Jerry Brito & Tate Watkins,
Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy, 3 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
39 (2011).
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